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Nothing evokes emotion like the term "family." Dan Quayle raised
the fraught term to new heights (or lows, depending on where you
stand) during the 1992 Presidential election. His tirade against
television sitcom character Murphy Brown's single motherhood
reflected one moment in a larger campaign to make "family values"
the new litmus test for political viability.2 Like so many sound bites,
this one encoded much as it worked its way through the cultural
landscape. Clearly, and most explicitly, Quayle's attack on single
mothers reserved special venom for those "feminist" single mothers
by choice (Murphy) and "dependent" poor, black, teenage, single
mothers.3  Thus, the term "family values" vilified those who
challenged-either directly or indirectly-the dominance and
desirability of the father-headed, nuclear family.
Not coincidentally, the "family values" debate emerged in the
context of growing discussion and examination of the multiplicity of
family forms. In an era when both the feminist and the gay
movements have challenged the centrality of the heterosexual
* Department of Sociology, Georgetown University.
1. SeeJohn E. Yang, Clinton Finds New Voice of Emotion," Quayle Decries Poverty of Values; Vice
President Urges Firm Hand in Cities, WASH. POST, May 20, 1992, at Al (arguing for the
reinforcement of family values, "hard work, integrity, [and] personal responsibility").
2. See id at Al (quoting Dan Quayle, "It doesn't help matters when prime-time TV has
Murphy Brown-a character who supposedly epitomizes today's intelligent, highly paid,
professional woman-mocking the importance of fathers by bearing a child alone and calling it
just another lifestyle choice").
3. See id at Al (stressing the importance of male role models in the home and declaring
marriage as "the best anti-poverty program"). In a meeting with a dozen tenants-all of whom
were black women-at the Hunter's View housing development in southeastern San Francisco,
Quayle voiced his concern of lack of males at the meeting. Id.
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nuclear family and its desirability4 (by the ongoing revelations of
child abuse, incest, wife battering, etc., as well as through the
exposure of more mundane forms of inequity and domination), the
phrase "family values" emerged as the catch-all term that attempted
to set up a great and impenetrable dividing line between "us" and
"them." "Family values," however, was not only restricted to its
obvious anti-feminist manifestations; it also became a code word for a
much more broad-based attack on family diversity and individual self-
expression." The deeming of gays and lesbians as "anti-family" is
nothing new in the history of homophobia.6 Indeed, both religious
and non-religious justifications for discrimination have often been
premised on the assumption that lesbian and gay "lifestyles" threaten
the sanctity of the nuclear family by proposing and practicing sexual
conduct not centered on reproduction.7 In addition, heterosexual
fears of gay "recruitment" ("they want our children") have always
been used to whip up anti-gay hysteria." Consequently, the Defense of
Marriage Ace became the medium through which right-wing "family
4. Compare National Pro-Family Coalition on the White House Conference on Families, in
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS RESOURCE BOOK (1981) (proposing that a family consists solely of
.persons who are related by blood, [heterosexual] marriage or adoption"), with Rebecca
Melton, Note, Legal Rights of Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples and Evolving
Definitions of 'Family", 29J. FAM. L. 497,499-500 (1991) (exploring changing social patterns that
alter the traditional definition of "family").
5. See generally Gary B. Melton, The Significance of Law in Everyday Lives of Children and
Families, 22 GA. L. REV. 851, 884-86 (1988) (discussing family values and diverse family
structures).
6. See Craig W. Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family Values by a
"Simulacrum of Marriage", 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1719 (discussing how social conservatives
perceive gay and lesbian family values as antithetical to the family institution).
7. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, Cj., concurring)
(commenting on the "ancient roots" of proscriptions against sodomy).
Condemnation of [homosexual conduct] is firmly rooted in Judeo-
Christian moral and ethical standards .... Blackstone described "the
infamous crime against nature" as an offense of "deeper malignity" than
rape, a heinous act "the very mention of which is a disgrace to human
nature," and "a crime not fit to be named" .... To hold that the act of
homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would
be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.
Id. at 196-97. But see id. at 199-211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("If [privacy] means anything, it
means that, before Georgia can prosecute its citizens for making choices about the most
intimate aspects of their lives, it must do more than assert that the choice they have made is an
'abominable crime not fit to be named among Christians.'" (quoting Herring v. State, 46 S.E.
876, 882 (Ga. 1904))).
8. See Recent Development, H. Utah Senate Bill 1003 Prohibiting Specified School Clubs, 23 J.
C NTEm'. L. 268, 273 (1997) (describing the fears of Utah legislators that the formation of gay
clubs would promote and recruit impressionable and "wavering children").
9. See Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C) (clarifying that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution does
not require that same-sex marriages be recognized by other states and defining marriage for
purposes of federal law as the union of one man and one woman).
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values" were expressed.10
No arena of social policy deserves more attention from the astute
mind of feminist legal theorist Martha Albertson Fineman than our
increasingly vexed and anti-feminist policies around issues of family
and dependent care. Our adamant refusal to provide even a
modicum of social support to care for the dependent and their
caretakers does little to strengthen the relationship between the state
and family. The abysmal state of American day care illustrates
governmental neglect of the welfare of children." Government has
instead relegated the care of children to unsupported (largely
female) individuals who are expected to provide this care within the
confines of a privatized family.
12
The emergence of the "family values" debate iterates the relentless
theme of American individualism, an individualism in which
privileged (largely white) males get the freedom to be individuals
(e.g., those putative free agents unfettered by dependent care) by
relying on the unremunerated, unacknowledged, and devalued labor
of "individuals" (largely women) who are expected to provide this
work and to receive the "unintended consequences" (limited job
mobility, lower wages, social diminution, poverty) with equanimity.
Those on the left (including feminists), however, have only timidly
countered the family values discourse. Those on the right have
chimed in to concur with Quayle, bemoaning the sorry state of family
life in the United States while attempting to put a kinder, gentler face
on patriarchal familialism.13 Others have toed a more discrete liberal
line, arguing for "family diversity" and taking issue with the tenor of
the attacks and the definitional frameworks (e.g., how we define
"good" families), rather than the deeper ideological structure of the
argument.14 I remember a wonderful conversation with a feminist
10. See Anna Dubrovsky, Same-Sex Maniage: A Struggle for Equal Rights, PrTFSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Sept. 10, 1996, at Al (describing the debates sponsored by Pennsylvania's State
Representative C. Allan Egoif over the Defense of Marriage Act and declaring that same-sex
marriages are "repugnant to traditional family values").
11. See Brief Analysis No. 248. Day Care: Children vs. Government (visited Oct. 6, 1999)
<http://www.public-policy.org/-ncpa/ba/ba248.html> (indicating that state and local regula-
tion of daycare facilities has reduced the supply of family daycare homes).
12. See Peter Pitegoff & Lauren Breen, Child Care Policy and the Welfare Reform Act, 6-WTRJ.
AFFORDABLE HouSINm & COMMUNrrYDEV. L. 113, 115 (1997) (finding that the elimination of
AFDC entitlement for poor families will result in the loss of federal entitlement to child care
support for families on welfare, thus creating a gap which states will either fill or leave many
low-income families without adequate child support).
13. See Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Righ THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 1, 1993, at 47
(arguing that diverse family forms harm children and undermine society).
14. See Shoshana Bricklin, Legislative Approaches to Support Family Diversity, 7 TEMP. POL. &
Civ. RTS. L. REv. 379, 380 (1998) (discussing various legislative campaigns in support of family
diversity rights).
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theorist and cultural critic-herself a central figure in the 1960's
radical feminism movement-in which we both expressed our desires
to articulate a more "in your face" position on "family values." She
argued, and I concurred, that feminists should proudly claim our
contributions to the destruction of the patriarchal nuclear family
instead of meekly arguing the "diverse" family line.
So it was with great anticipation that I approached Martha
Albertson Fineman's, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence,
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 15 primed as I was by both an admiration
for its author and a desire to radically rethink family/social life.
Fineman's work has always been compelling both for the detail it
offers into the variegated relations between state, civil society, gender,
and family and for the freshness with which it offers challenges to
those very relations. In her ground-breaking and controversial book,
The Neutered Mother, 6  Fineman provocatively argued for the
disassociation of parenting with partnering and pointed out the
deleterious effects of a conflation of these two.' 7 In this book, she
claims that what should be socially valued and socially supported are
relations of inevitable and real dependency (that between parent and
child, or the ill and their caretakers)" and that our social supports
should provide real and substantive resources for the necessary and
inevitable act of caretaking, not for the supposed union of two
nondependent adults (marriage). 19 As a gay activist and scholar, I am
drawn to Fineman's critique of the "sexual family" and her argument
that the conflation of parenting and partnering lies at the heart of
mutually determining inequities within gendered institutions such as
the family and the state."
In Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-
Sufficiency, Fineman continues with the line of thought developed in
The Neutered Mother, but perhaps for a different audience. While The
Neutered Mother spoke eloquently to feminist social and legal theorists,
this piece is of a different nature, less emboldened to make large and
15. Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and
Self-Sufficincy. 8 AM. U.J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 13 (2000).
16. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TENTiETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
17. See id. at 227-31 (describing a new legal category of family centered on dependency that
would be protected and preferred by the state).
18. See id. at 227-28 (calling the notion of the natural family a failure for failing to balance
"the demands for equality and the contemporary manifestations of... dependency").
19. See id. at 228-30 (arguing for the dissolution of marriage as a legal category and the
equalization of all sexual relationships).
20. See id. at 145-66 (elaborating on society's assumption of a sexual family, which stands as
an institution of "horizontal" intimacy based on romantic heterosexual affiliations).
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radical claims and more eager to avoid antagonisms than take on the
Right. Here, I think she intends to find a way to push along the
dialogue, to insert feminist legal theory into the truncated discourse
on family and state. Too often, legal scholars and feminist academics
find it difficult to make the connections between their important
insights into power and its manifestations in policy decisions and the
minutiae of everyday life. To her credit, Fineman eagerly redresses
this problem and uses her legal and intellectual skills to make policy
suggestions, and intervenes in the process of constructing "common
sense" ways of thinking. This is all to the good. As a scholar who
yearns for the growth of a cadre of public intellectuals, I am pleased
to see her take this step.
This foray into public discourse, however, makes her piece seem
rather obvious, thus breaking little new ground. Fineman's thesis is
simply not innovative enough.2 She focuses on dependency, and the
ways in which most mainstream accounts forego substantive
discussion of dependency by treating the family as "separate,
governed by an independent set of expectations and rules."2 2 Many
others (particularly, sociologists Mary McIntosh and Michelle Barrett
in the classic socialist-feminist critique The Anti-Social Family) 23 have
made the vital point that the family acts as an "anti-social" institution
in which all of the social problems of dependency--nurture,
intimacy, and emotionality-are foisted upon isolated nuclear
families and the women who are expected to serve them.4 Such a
principle denudes the public sphere of those "familial" values and
creates a bifurcated social world in which the family stands alone as a
haven where values of care, nurture, and dependency are separable
from civil society and the state. Like Barrett and McIntosh, Fineman
seeks to unpack the relations between state, family, dependency, and
autonomy.2
Fineman correctly points out that our particular (and dangerous)
understandings of the family rely on particular visions of the
individual and our understanding of what the state is and to whom it
21. This in itself is not problematic. Innovation need not be a criterion for validity in
theorizing. What matters, I suppose, is what she does with this thesis and how she articulates
new responses.
22. Fineman, supra note 15, at 13.
23. MARY MCINTOSH & MICHELLE BARREtr, THE ANTI-SOCIAL FAMILY (1982).
24. See Ue. at 85 (discussing how the nuclear family is an anomaly in western civilization,
and how it fits the functions and needs of the capitalistic mode of production).
25. See Fineman, supra note 15, at 21 (asserting that the state should ensure that market
institutions respond more positively to burdens of dependence, such as those encumbered by
workers with dual responsibilities).
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is responsible.26  These understandings, however, are hidden
backdrops because we idealize family as a separable private space.
This "assumed family" "distorts analysis and policy" because not only
is it hidden from view, its responsibilities for nurture and dependency
fall inordinately on the shoulders of women. 7
Fineman takes the feminist and left maxim of collective
responsibility into the heart of family and social policy. What does it
really mean, she asks, to have collective responsibility for individuals
(indeed, large classes of people such as children) who live in
structured and inevitable conditions of dependence?28  The answer
comes down to social supports and the rights one does or does not
have to those supports.2 Fineman is right on the money when she
points out that "we all live subsidized lives." 0 From state supports to
fairmers,5 ' to breaks for corporate relocations, 2 to the vicissitudes of
our complex tax system,3 we are all in various ways supported-
directly and indirectly-by a government that deems certain groups
and identities worthy of support (e.g., farmers) and others unworthy
(e.g., women caring for children).34
For years, feminists have debated and deconstructed the notions of
"autonomy" and how it constructs a particularly gendered and
limited sense of the independent "self."" From the work of Carol
26. See Fineman, supra note 15, at 13 (stating that theorists who focus on the individual
appear to neglect the significance of the family institution in their work).
27. See Fineman, supra note 15, at 14 (describing the "assumed family" concept as a
"specific ideological construct with a particular population and a gendered form that enables us
to privatize individual dependency").
28. See Fineman, supra note 15, at 18 (asserting that inevitable dependency necessitates
collective or societal concern).
29. See generally Joel F. Handler, "Construding the Political Spectacle": The Interpretation of
Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 899, 905
(1990) (showing that "social rights" to programs, such as Social Security insurance, illustrates
the distinction between needs and entitlements).
30. See Fineman, supra note 15, at 22 (contending that no one lives self-sufficently in
modern society).
31. See Richard F. Prim, Minnesota's Anti-Corporate Farm Statute Revisited: Competing Visions in
Agriculture, and the Legislature's Recent Attempt to Empower Minnesota Livestock Farmers, 18 HAMLINE
L. REV. 431, 433-35 (1995) (discussing the implication's of Minnesota's anti-corporate farm
statute, which forbade corporate entities from owning corporate land and from "engaging in
farming"). The statute presumably preserved family farms. Id.
32. See Mark Taylor, Note, A Proposal to Prohibit IndustrialRelocation Subsidies, 72 TEX. L. REV.
669, 671-77 (1994) (discussing the history of industrial relocation subsidies).
33. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process
as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1990) (discussing the public
interest theory and economic theory with regard to tax legislation).
34. See Gary A. Winters, Note, Unconstitutional Conditions as "Nonsubsidies: When is Deference
Inappropriate?, 80 GEO. LJ. 131, 132 (1991) (examining whether government allocation
schemes affect constitutional rights).
35. See generally CAROL GILIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY &
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Gilligan and others, debate has raged over the relative merits of
challenging the notion of the autonomous self as a particularly male
construct of individualism.36 That construct rests on the assumption
of a more "relational" female self that does the emotional and
physical work of caretaking-work that allows the very concept of an
autonomous self to emerge as "natural."37 While Fineman does not
invoke this work and this debate directly, it is clearly part of the
backdrop. Yet her attempts to challenge our limited notions of
autonomy, independence, dependency, and need are strangely
hollow. For Fineman, "[i] ndependence is gained when an individual
has the basic resources that enable her or him to act consistent with
the tasks and expectations imposed by the society. " 8 This principle
not only weakens the case for independence,"9 but falls dangerously
close to a separate but equal framework. I know Fineman has no
desire to construct a rubric whereby women who are "assigned [the]
vital societal function" ° of caretaking are simply better provided for
by a more active state. Indeed, she indicates elsewhere a real desire
to challenge the privatization of childcare and the location of that
care in the hands of isolated women.41 Although she argues that
financial redistribution is not the whole picture,42 she lends herself to
that very possibility by relying on such limited visions and such timid
propositions.
Fineman does, however, develop some innovations, particularly
around the concept of derivative dependency.43 With this concept,
she argues that relations of dependency are not only inevitable, but
also those who care for the dependent, become themselves dependent
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 128-29 (1982) (analyzing how women generally describe themselves,
and how conceptions of morality and the self act in situations of conflict and choice).
36. See iU. at 128 (noting the different modes of reasoning and ethical decisions employed
by men and women).
37. See id. at 7-8 (attributing the differences in the development of the male and female
self-concepts "not to autonomy but rather to 'the fact that women, universally, are responsible
for early child care.'").
38. Fineman, supra note 15, at 25.
39. Couldn't independence also be about our understanding of our inevitable relations
with others, our mutually constitutive identities?
40. Fineman, supra note 15, at 26.
41. See Fineman, supra note 15, at 25 (questioning whether society can continue to have a
traditional family model, given the continuous increase in divorce rates and women expecting
to be wage earners, wives, and mothers).
42. SeeFineman, supra note 15, at 25 (suggesting other important questions, in addition to
those involving redistribution, that would have been discussed had there been a public forum).
43. See Fineman, supra note 15, at 20 (describing derivative dependency as arising on the
"person who assumes responsibility for the care of the inevitable dependent person").
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on the resources necessary for that care.44 She correctly asserts that
derivative dependency distributes inequitably around gender and
that the individual caretaker bears the responsibility and burden of
that caretaking, thus allowing others (institutions and individuals) off
the hook, both relationally and economically. 5 But like so much of
her argument, Fineman leaves it at that.
I must say that I found this a tough piece to write about. While I
am wholly sympathetic to Fineman's core arguments, I found her
piece curiously deficient. I felt it lacked a deep and substantive
engagement with the ideological conditions and social benefits that
enact this alchemy that transforms the social family into the
privatized family of female responsibility. The weakness of Fineman's
suggestions, such as a sort of national dialogue A la Clinton's
"initiative on race,"46 reveals an inability to reckon with the
ideological work of the "family values" debate, and the very real
benefits to a particular class of social actors in maintaining the
fictional binarism of independence/dependence. The dialogue
strategy has always seemed fundamentally weak, precisely because of
the deep liberalism at its core.47 The "can't we all just get along"
mixture of Habermasian "ideal speech" (in some utopian civil
society) with communitarian fictions of shared values, ignores the
very real and material questions of power, privilege, interest, and
ideology.4 This reminds me of the folks who believe there is
"common ground" to be found between anti-abortionists blocking
clinic access and those of us who believe a woman has a right and
responsibility to control her own reproductive life. 9 While I am all
for discourse, I cannot abide by the dangerous fictions that assume
that the reactionary Christian Right are just befuddled folks who want
44. See Fineman, supra note 15, at 20 (stating that "[c]aretakers have a need for monetary
and material resources").
45. See Fineman, supra note 15, at 21 (arguing that societal institutions assign its members
scripts rooted in ideologies, which focus on individual choice and avoid general responsibility
for caretaking roles).
46. See Fineman, supra note 15, at 24 (referring to President Clinton's initiation of a
Commission which had the responsibility of organizing public discussions on racial concerns).
47. See Fineman, supra note 15, at 24 (suggesting a national dialogue on dependency to
improve the effects of welfare reform).
48. See JURGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 202
(1990) (stating that "[d]iscourse or argumentation is a more exacting type of communication
... .[It] generalizes, abstracts, and stretches the presuppositions of context-bound
communicative actions by extending their range to include competent subjects beyond the
provincial limits of their own particular form of life").
49. See generally Peggy Hau, The Politis of Law, Language, & Morality: Thucydides & the
Abortion Debate, 8 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. LJ. 711, 740-41 (1999) (discussing various viewpoints
shared by both anti-abortion and abortion-ights advocates).
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the best for all. There are real investments people have in certain
conceptions of family and of women's responsibility for caretaking
that are both ideologically salient and materially beneficial.
Fineman's idea that a public forum would provide "nonpartisan"
discussion in a "depoliticized" manner 5° is both illusory and self-
defeating. What is nonpartisan? Is that a place where no one has
beliefs and values and identities they hold dear? This always seems to
me the emptiest sort of language, analogous to the scientists who still
cling to some idea of objectivity and non-bias. The problem is not
that it is political, but that one group has been allowed to put the
stamp of its (anti-feminist, anti-gay, racist) politics on the debate,
while keeping ours marginalized and demonized. We need more
political talk about families, more like Fineman's feminist, left maxim
critique.
Another area that illustrates Fineman's reluctance to take a more
radical stance vis-a.-vis the Right's attack on feminism (via the single
mother) concerns her insistence that we base the argument for social
responsibility for dependency on the universal "truth" of biological
dependence. 1 By relying on this paradigm, the model of parent-
child becomes overly paradigmatic and restricted to a more
thoroughgoing debate about a just society. We need to make
arguments for a collective responsibility that does not rely on a
"bedrock" of the infantile body. Her reliance on this universal
biological reality limits her ability to radically re-orient our thinking
on the family. Indeed, one could imagine a slightly more just social
order, which would acknowledge the inevitable biological
dependency of the child and provide a richer and more abundant
array of social services to compensate and aid the caretaker. Surely,
that scenario need not necessarily alter our sense of who is
responsible for the daily work of caretaking. In addition, it states
nothing about the need to go beyond redistributive justice and to
think our way out of and beyond the limits of familialism, to envision
ways of nurturing and loving that are not bound by familial lines.
Granted, caretakers must be better provided for and must not find
themselves at a professional and social disadvantage because they do
the socially necessary labor that allows society itself to exist. I am all
for basic income guarantees and the Democratic Socialism 101 that
50. See Fineman, supra note 15, at 24 (suggesting that society could have obtained
"thoughtful, informative, and depoliticized" discussions about implications of dependency if
President Clinton had employed a mechanism similar to his initiative on race to welfare
reform).
51. See Fineman, supra note 15, at 18 (stating that "inevitable dependenc[ies]" are
biological in nature).
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Fineman offers. But isn't it time to think a bit more utopically?-To
really take on the kinds of sexist and racist tropes propagated by the
right? Tropes they are, and here is where Fineman fails to see the
forest for the trees. To engage in a debate around the family, one
must reckon with the discursive war (in television, in film, in popular
journalism, in advertising, in government rhetoric, and in sound-
bites) that allows a patently ridiculous phrase like "family values" to
be treated as the legitimate staging ground for substantive meaning
production.
As a lesbian single mother by choice, I know all too well the effects
of privatization and reliance on reluctant social supports. Financially
stable and free from the vindictive web of welfare services, I have
avoided much of the deleterious effects that many women in less
fortunate circumstances find themselves. Even as I mull over my own
(privileged) situation, however, I cannot help but worry that the
solutions offered by Fineman fall far short of the kind of radical
restructuring that needs to take place." Simply put, a redistributive
mechanism is not enough and may provide a circuitous way for male
privilege to continue unabated, as current socially supported female
caretakers become more and more mired in domesticity. This was
the argument made long ago against the intriguing idea of "wages for
housework."'3 Allowing women to be better-paid caretakers seems a
poor substitute for implementing socialized childcare. You could not
pay me a million bucks to stay home all day with my kid, as much as I
dearly adore her. Granted, if my option was a dead-end job with no
hope of advancement, being a well-paid mom might not look so bad.
We need to discuss, however, the relationship between not simply the
family and state, but also between family and work. I think we need
to thoroughly rethink our system of individual parental childcare
rather than make it more affordable. We need to do this not only for
the desired goal of truly socializing the responsibility for children
(and I am surprised how little she says here about the need for
affordable, quality, accessible childcare), but because adults need
adult engagement and meaningful work.
52. Of course, it goes without saying that her assumption of heterosexuality is problematic.
Her argument rests on a resolutely heterosexist presentation of existing structures. Certainly
these are dominant, but it would have helped her argument to counterpose the (mystifying)
discourse of family (that has little to do with evolving structures that are often
multigenerational and nonfamilial) with the lived relations of alternative structures.
53. See generally Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor Into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW.
U. L. REV. 1, 24 (1996) (discussing the Cooperative Housekeeping movement, which allowed
women's housework to be subjected to the same modernization and efficiendes as men's work
in a capitalist economy).
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I am not one of those feminists who think the movement is all
about "choice." I do not think Fineman is either. I think that the
privatized, nuclear family is a health hazard and a social calamity,
particularly for women and children. Fineman correctly states that
we need to crack the foundational myths that mystify the ways in
which caretaking labor supports the entire social order. We need to
hold those who benefit from this unacknowledged labor
economically and socially accountable. To do so, however, requires
more than cracking the foundations. We need to smash 'em.

